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ABSTRACT
The success of an auction design often hinges on its ability
to set parameters such as reserve price and bid levels that
will maximize an objective function such as the auctioneer
revenue. Works on designing adaptive auction mechanisms
have emerged recently, and the challenge is in learning dif-
ferent auction parameters by observing the bidding in pre-
vious auctions. In this paper, we propose a non-parametric
method for determining discrete bid levels dynamically so
as to maximize the auctioneer revenue. First, we propose a
non-parametric kernel method for estimating the probabili-
ties of closing price with past auction data. Then a greedy
strategy has been devised to determine the discrete bid lev-
els based on the estimated probability information of clos-
ing price. We show experimentally that our non-parametric
method is robust to changes in parameters such as the dis-
tributions of participating bidders as well as the individual
bidder evaluation, and it consistently outperforms different
competitors with various settings with respect to auctioneer
revenue maximization.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.6 [Computing Methods]: Artificial Intelligence-Learning
General Terms
Algorithms, Electronic Economics
Keywords
adaptive auction, bid levels, Kernel density estimation, greedy
method
1. INTRODUCTION
Online internet auction is becoming an important and
popular mechanism in electronic commerce. The prevalence
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of online auctions in major platforms such as ebay and Ama-
zon has spawned interesting research problems for agent-
mediated auctions [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].
Previous research has shown that parameters such as re-
serve price, minimum bid increments, and bidder valua-
tion distribution greatly affect the auction outcome. Hence,
much attention has been given to design techniques that can
learn or tune the aforementioned parameters so as to max-
imize auctioneer revenue, which include [6, 7, 8] for setting
the discrete bid levels, and [9] for determining the reserve
price. Rogers et al [6] proposed a powerful model for de-
termining optimal discrete bid levels both numerically and
analytically, and provided some specific forms of distribu-
tions on bidder valuation or number of bidders. However, in
some scenarios, the underlying data distribution could not
be identified easily, or may be identified wrongly due to the
presence of noise or outlier in the data that distort the true
data distribution. Another problem of their model (along
with many others in the literature) is poor flexibility, in the
sense that they adhere to the parameter values computed,
and naturally the performance will deteriorate in dynamic
settings where the bidder valuation distribution may change
in successive auctions (rendering the parameter values in-
valid).
An adaptive auction is one that learns to adjust parame-
ter values dynamically in response to past empirical bidder
behavior so as to maximize an objective function such as the
auctioneer revenue. Specifically, through observing previous
auction results, assumptions (such as the specific form of
bidder valuation distributions) are made for the constructed
model, in order to work out the desired parameters that will
be used in the successive auctions.
The objective of our work is to devise a method to effi-
ciently and adaptively compute bid levels that seeks to maxi-
mize the auctioneer revenue, taking into consideration possi-
ble change of bidder valuation from one auction to the next.
The motivation behind our proposed scheme are that in real
world applications, (1) it is often difficult if not impossible to
estimate bidder valuation distribution accurately, and pre-
assumptions do not always comply to the real distribution of
bidder valuation; and (2) bidder valuation distribution may
change during repeated auctions, in view of the changing
supply and demand relation of the item that is being auc-
tioned. Consider the following scenario. Suppose 10 units
of an item are being auctioned, and bidder valuation is $10
in average; during the course of auctions, news is released
that there will be 100 more such items to be auctioned, thus
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the average bidder valuation may drop to $8 due to sud-
den surge in supply. This kind of distribution change during
auction cannot be handled by existing schemes, since they
pre-assume a specific form of bidder valuation distribution
(e.g., normal, exponential, uniform etc) and adhere through-
out the whole auction until such items are sold out. Aiming
to deal with above problems, our scheme consists of two
steps: first, we accurately estimate the probability distri-
bution of closing price (i.e. the probability that an auction
will close on a specific price level); second, we determine the
bid levels that will in turn be used for successive auctions
based on the result of the first step. Our contributions are
as follows:
• We propose a non-parametric method based on ker-
nel function for estimating probability of closing price.
This method is well-known in statistical machine learn-
ing for its accurate and robust probability density es-
timation when there is little or no information about
the data distribution or there are noises contained in
the data.
• Based on the estimated probability distribution of the
closing price, we then devise a simple greedy heuristic
strategy for choosing the bid levels so as to maximize
the auctioneer revenue.
• We conduct a series of detailed experiments over vari-
ous settings, and results show that our method consis-
tently outperforms others in terms of average revenue.
In particular, the kernel method can well model the
underlying distribution of the data without knowing
the exact distribution form of the data beforehand;
furthermore, it performs better than other methods
in situations where the bidder valuation distribution
changes as the auction proceeds.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A brief
review of related work is given in Section 2. After that,
we present the auction mechanism followed by our method
for deriving bid levels in Section 3. Detailed experimental
results are presented in Section 4. Finally we conclude the
paper in section 5.
2. RELATED WORK
In this paper we consider the context of English auction
with discrete bid levels. The problem of investigating the
optimal discrete bid levels has been studied in [6, 7, 8].
Rothkopf et al [8] considered the question of determining the
optimal number and distribution of bid levels, and discussed
how discrete bid levels affect auctioneer expected revenue.
In particular, two different distributions of bidder valuation,
namely uniform and exponential, are analyzed and results
show that evenly spaced bid levels are found to be the opti-
mal in case of uniform bidder valuation; whereas the optimal
bid increment was shown to increase as the auction proceeds.
Rogers et al [6, 7] extended the work of [8] by designing a
general analysis on the relation between revenue and discrete
bid levels implemented. Optimal results for bid levels can
be determined numerically through their model. Meanwhile,
Bayesian inference was adopted for estimating the number
and valuation distribution of the bidders through observing
the closing price of previous auctions. Models proposed in
these work rely on pre-specified assumptions, such as the
number of participating bidder and their valuations follow
some kind of distributions, in order to work out the optimal
bid level parameters. These assumptions, however, are not
always easily satisfied for modeling the data in real world ap-
plications. For example, bidder valuation distribution may
change significantly as the auction proceeds, or the exact
form of underlying distribution is simply complicated to de-
termine.
Recently, non-parametric statistical techniques have emerged
to address problems of distribution estimation. These model-
independent techniques can work well in modeling the un-
derlying distribution, with little even no knowledge about
the nature of the data. Bichler et al [10] devised a non-
parametric method for estimating reserve prices in procure-
ment auctions. The method is based on a kernel density
estimator and uses an order statistics to derive the optimal
reserve price, so as to maximize the auctioneer revenue. In
contrast to traditional auction theory, the authors use the
bidder’s risk statement for getting a winning bid as a key cri-
terion to set an optimal reserve price. The reserve price for a
given probability can then be derived from the distribution
function of the observed drop-out bids.
Similar work on learning reserve price was proposed by
Pardoe et al [9], who explored the problem of adaptive auc-
tion mechanism design using techniques from machine learn-
ing. Their observation is that many existing auction mecha-
nisms are relying on model assumptions and sometimes the
analytic process for the model is so complicated that the op-
timal mechanism cannot be obtained efficiently. To address
this challenge, a metalearning scheme is proposed which can
identify the parameters, over past data of bidder behavior,
affecting some objective function (e.g., auctioneer revenue)
when the bidder behavior is unknown. Specifically, they
model the choice of optimal reserve price among a set of
possible values as the k-armed bandit problem, which can
be solved efficiently using SoftMax or ²-greedy strategy [11,
12]. They also employ the Bayesian inference technique to
compute the optimal reserve price based on distributional
information of a bidder population that are available in ad-
vance. Other research literature related to auction mecha-
nism design includes theoretical work on online learning for
online auctions [3, 13].
Inspired from the above works, our approach is a non-
parametric technique based on a kernel method for estimat-
ing the distribution of the closing price. Based on the esti-
mated closing price probability, we propose a simple greedy
strategy to determine the bid levels such that the revenue is
maximized. The merits of utilizing a non-parametric tech-
nique is that it is robust and accurate for distribution esti-
mation even there are noises and outliers in the data. And
in case of change in the bidder valuation over successive auc-
tions, our scheme is able to capture the distribution change
and propose bid levels accordingly.
3. AUCTION MODEL AND KERNEL ESTI-
MATOR BASED METHOD
In this section we present the context of our study - the
English auction scenario. We then present our proposed
kernel method to estimate the distribution of closing price.
A greedy strategy is then presented for choosing bid levels
based on the estimated distribution of closing price.
3.1 English Auction Scenario Defined
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We consider an ascending English auction setting that was
also used in [6, 8]: there is a risk neutral auctioneer, max-
imum b number of risk neutral bidders, and n identical (or
not necessarily identical, but similar) items which are being
sold one unit at a time to bidders by the auctioneer. Associ-
ated with each bidder valuation is a continuous probability
density function f(x) within the range [Vmin, Vmax], where
Vmin (Vmax) is the lower (upper) bound of bidder valuation.
Assume there are m+1 discrete bid levels, starting at l0 and
ending at lm, and Vmin ≤ l0 < ... < lm ≤ Vmax. The bidders
participate in an ascending price auction, each of which can
propose bids that are restricted to the discrete bid levels.
The auction starts with the auctioneer announcing the first
discrete bid level (basically the first bid level is the reserve
price of the auction), and check whether there are bidders
who are willing to pay this amount. If there is no bidder will-
ing to pay within a predetermined and publicly-announced
time interval, the auction closes and the item remains un-
sold. If a bid is received, the auction continues and the
auctioneer again check bidders’ willingness to pay the next
bid level. If no bidders are willing to pay this new price,
the auction then closes and the item is sold to the current
highest bidder. The selling price is called the closing price of
the auction. This is called a round of the auction, and the
auction continues from one round to the next. Suppose the
closing price is li in round i, then the auctioneer revenue in
this round is (li − l0). Previous work builds up an analytic
model, in which the closing price distribution is computed
at first based on some assumptions such as distributions of
bidder valuation and number of participating bidders, and
then bid levels are determined based the computed closing
price distribution as well as the assumptions [6, 7]. However,
these models are complicated to solve and highly sensitive
to incorrect assumptions, which, in turn, will affect the auc-
tioneer average revenue by providing poor bid levels.
Given the above auction setting, we suppose there are
W (W ≥ m + 1) distinct values in [Vmin, Vmax] for the
auctioneer to choose from, that is, the input is given as
vi ∈ [Vmin, Vmax] for i = 1, ...,W , and vi 6= vj for i 6= j.
Then our problem can be formulated as an optimization
problem that chooses as bid levels m + 1 distinct values
from among these W values such that the total auctioneer
revenue is maximized.
3.2 Estimating the PDF of Closing Price
After a certain number of auction rounds, the auctioneer
may begin to observe the previous closing prices, i.e. check
how many times the auction closed at a specific price level
for each of the W price levels. The closing price is crucial
to the auctioneer revenue, which is a function of the bidder
valuation [6, 8]. However the bidder valuation distribution
is usually secret or unknown to the auctioneer, the auction-
eer may only observe the publicly known closing prices of
the previous auction rounds so that he can revise bid levels
accordingly in subsequent auctions.
In this section, we will estimate the probability density
function (PDF) of the closing price using a non-parametric
method, specifically the kernel density estimation technique.
The advantages of the non-parametric method over para-
metric method in density estimation are that (1) it requires
less pre-assumptions about the data, and (2) it can provide
robust estimation results with respect to existence of noises
or outliers in the data [14].
Suppose the closing price x, with observation falling within
[Vmin, Vmax], is a random variable with an unknown prob-
ability density function f(.), and there are n observations
x1, x2, ..., xn obtained from previous closing prices. Here
xi ∈ {vj}, i = 1, ..., n and j = 1, ...,W . The kernel density
estimator f̂(x) for the estimation of the probability density
value at point (a specific closing price) xi is defined as
f̂(xi) =
1
nh
n∑
j=1
K(
xi − xj
h
) (1)
whereK(.) is the kernel function and h the bandwidth, which
is smoothing parameter to control the degree of smooth-
ing applied to the data. The above kernel estimator is also
known as the Rosenblatt-Parzen kernel density estimator
[14], and is a popular statistical curve estimation technique.
Mathematically, a kernel function is designed such that
it must satisfy the following: (1) it is non-negative; and
(2)
∫ +∞
−∞ K(u)du = 1. There are various kernel functions
available, the commonly used kernel functions include the
standard Gaussian function:
K(u) =
1√
2pi
e−u
2/2
and the uniform function:
K(u) =
{
1
2
u ≤ 1
0 otherwise
The PDF of the closing price is then obtained through
the kernel estimator, which provides information on how
likely the auction will be closed at a specific price level for
each of the W distinct price levels, given the current bidder
population. In some cases, the valuation distribution of the
same bidder population may change over time. This may be
caused by factors such as bidder’s change of interest, or sup-
plies and demands of the item being auctioned. Modeling
changes of valuation distribution is almost impossible for ex-
isting auction models [6, 7], since these models simply do not
know from what time the bidder valuation changes. Thus
they will adhere to obsolete assumptions (e.g., on bidder
valuation distribution) instead of making adjustment to the
new valuation distribution. One possible way for detecting
valuation change is to apply statistical goodness-of-fit test on
the previous closing price data, and a departure of the test
result from pre-assumed distribution means that the bidder
valuation may have changed. The kernel method, however,
can detect bidder valuation change accordingly as the auc-
tion proceeds, since at the start of each round the kernel
estimator will be invoked to calculate the newly PDF of
the closing price. The change of bidder valuation will im-
mediately reflect on the closing price.
3.3 Greedy Heuristic for Setting Bid Levels
Having obtained the PDF of closing price, the auctioneer
is in a position to devise the bid levels so that his revenue
is maximized in subsequent auctions. One might utilize the
scheme in [6] that solves an optimization problem based on
the estimated PDF of closing price. In this section we will
propose a simple greedy strategy to choose bid levels, which
is easy to implement, and also performs well in various sim-
ulation settings (as shown in Section 4).
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Expected Revenue Increase. Consider the auction setting
introduced in Section 3.1, where there is a risk neutral auc-
tioneer, maximum number of b risk neutral bidders and n
identical (or similar) items. Recall that the bidder valuation
falls within [Vmin, Vmax], and there arem+1 discrete bid lev-
els each of which takes a value from W distinct price levels.
The auctioneer determines the m + 1 bid levels one by one
before the auction round start. When determining bid level
li, in order to indicate which of the W price levels can be
chosen for li we define the Expected Revenue Increase (ERI).
Essentially, our greedy strategy relies on ERI for choosing
bid levels. For ease of discussion, we use figures (see Figure
1) to show how to compute the ERI for each price level.
In Figure 1, suppose there are three price levels vi, vj and
vk chosen as bid levels. Note that the price levels chosen
in order may not necessarily correspond to bid levels in as-
cending order. For example, in Figure 1 vi is chosen as a bid
level at first, followed by vj choosing as another bid level and
finally vk is determined as the last bid level. However, the
final bid levels are l0 = vk, l1 = vi and l2 = vj , in which the
order of bid levels are different to the order of price levels
chosen. Now consider there is no bid level chosen (see Figure
1(a)), for bidders with valuations falling within [Vmin, Vmax],
the auction will close with item unsold. So the revenue is 0.
Suppose we are examining whether vi could be chosen as a
first bid level Figure 1(b). We then calculate the resulting
goodness if vi is indeed chosen as a bid level, which is given
as:
vR∑
V=vi
(vi − vL) ∗ f̂(V )
Here vL (vR) is the immediate left (right) price level that
has been chosen as bid level, in case there is no immediate
left (right) price level has been chosen as bid level, we define
vL = Vmin (vR = Vmax). f̂(V ) is the probability density
value, estimated through the kernel method, at price level
V . The intuition behind this sum is that if there are bidders
whose valuations fall within [vi, Vmax], the auction will close
at vi, and the expected revenue increase for setting vi as
bid level would be the product of absolute revenue increase
(vi− vL) and the closing probabilities of the price levels be-
tween [vi, Vmax]. Since we do not know bidder valuation
distribution exactly, we just take into account the probabili-
ties of all the price levels (which correspond to closing prices
that are functionally dependent on bidder valuation distri-
bution) falling within [vi, Vmax] as an indicator of goodness
if setting vi as a bid level. Note that in an auction round all
the bid levels are required to be distinctly chosen from W
price levels in m+1 steps, thus a price level V that has been
chosen as a bid level at step t will not be examined again
in step t + 1, t ∈ [1,m]. After vi is chosen as a bid level,
the ERI of next price level being examined, i.e., vj , is then
calculated as see Figure 1(c):
vR∑
V=vj
(vj − vL) ∗ f̂(V )
where vL = vi and vR = Vmax. Similarly, after vj is deter-
mined as a second bid level, we obtain the ERI of vk as see
Figure 1(d):
vR∑
V=vk
(vk − vL) ∗ f̂(V )
Price 
Level
Vmin Vmax
Closing 
Prob.
Vmin Vmax
(a)
(b)
vi
Price 
Level
vj
(c)
Closing 
Prob.
Vmin Vmax
(d)
vkVmin Vmaxvi vjvi
For vi, vL=Vmin, vR=Vmax
For vj, vL=vi, vR=Vmax For vk, vL=Vmin, vR=vi
Closing 
Prob.
Price 
Level
Closing
Prob.
Price 
Level
Figure 1: An illustration for analyzing expected rev-
enue increase
with vL = vmin and vR = vi.
Formally, for each price level vi ∈ [Vmin, Vmax], i = 1, ...,W ,
its expected revenue increase is defined as:
ERI(vi) =
vR∑
V=vi
(vi − vL) ∗ f̂(V ) (2)
where vL (vR) is the immediate left (right) price level that
has been chosen as bid level. In case there is no immediate
left (right) price level has been chosen as bid level, we define
vL = Vmin (vR = Vmax).
Greedy Heuristic for Choosing Bid Levels. Having com-
puted the expected revenue increase (ERI), we can now de-
vise a greedy method to determine the bid levels. Suppose
we are to determine m bid levels for an auction round (note
we set l0 = Vmin as reserve price, thus there are m bid levels
need to determine), we perform the selection process in m
steps with each step a price level is determined as a bid level.
Specifically, at first step, we examine the W price levels by
calculating their ERI according to Equation 2, respectively.
The price level with maximum ERI value is chosen as a first
bid level. Note that this price level will not be examined
again in the next m steps. At second step, the ERI of the
rest W − 1 price levels are calculated, again, the price level
with largest ERI is chosen as a second bid level. This pro-
cess repeats until all the m bid levels are determined. The
auctioneer then adopts these m bid levels during the auc-
tion (along with the reserve price l0 = Vmin), and announces
them in turn (from l0 all the way to lm if possible). When
the auction finishes, the closing price is recorded as history
data, on which the kernel method will be performed in order
to compute the new probability density of the closing prices
that is used for the next round.
Mathematically, at each step in determining bid levels, a
price level V is chosen as a bid level if it yields the largest
ERI value, that is:
V = argmax
vj
{ERI(vj)} (3)
Hence, at the begin of an auction round, the m bid levels
are determined one by one through greedily picking the price
level with the largest ERI in each step. The greedy method
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Input: Closing price data of previous round,
a set V with W price levels
1. Estimate probability density of Closing Price
f̂(V ) using kernel method
2. l = {}
3. For i = 1 to m
4. For vj ∈ {V − l}
5. Compute ERI(vj)
6. li = argmaxvj{ERI(vj)}
7. l = l ∪ li
Output: m bid levels li ∈ l
Figure 2: Algorithm for Setting Bid Levels
is simple and intuitive in nature, however in most appli-
cations the greedy method can produce near-optimal solu-
tion to the problem. The algorithm for our kernel estimator
based method for choosing optimal bid levels is outlined in
Figure 2. Note we set l0 = Vmin as reserve price, so there are
only m bid levels to determine. To begin an auction round,
the algorithm is executed first to estimate probability den-
sity of the closing price, followed by the greedy method to
compute the bid levels. These bid levels are announced in
turn, iterate until no bidder is willing to pay the specific bid
level, and the round is complete. The closing price is then
recorded as closing price data for the next round.
The intuition for using the ERI as a measure for guid-
ing the choice of bid levels is that a traditional measure
named expected revenue sum does not work well in some
cases. In particular, the expected revenue sum is defined
as
∑m
i=1 li ∗ P (li), where m is the number of bid levels and
P (li) is the probability that auction will close at bid level li.
To choose the m optimal bid levels , the goal is to find m
out of the W price levels such that the sum is maximized [8,
6, 7]. However, the bid levels chosen by using the expected
revenue sum are not always guaranteed to be optimal. One
drawback of using the expected revenue sum is that the re-
sulting bid levels might be unnecessarily too fine. The other
is that the resulting bid levels may not be optimal. Next we
give an example to show the shortcomings of the measure
expected revenue sum.
EXAMPLE 1. Suppose there are 6 price levels v1 =
1, v2 = 2, v3 = 3, v4 = 4, v5 = 5 and v6 = 6, and we need
to choose m = 2 bid levels from the 6 price levels. Also as-
sume that the closing probabilities P (vi),i = 1, ..., 6 for the 6
prices levels are 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.18, 0.12 and 0.1, respectively.
The reserve price is set to 0. According to the measure ex-
pected revenue sum, we compute the expected revenue for
each price level through multiplying the closing probabil-
ity by price level value, i.e., for v1 its expected revenue is
0.1 ∗ 1 = 0.1. Similarly, the expected revenue for v2 to v6
are 0.4, 0.9, 0.72, 0.6 and 0.6 respectively. Following the mea-
sure, we choose v3 at first and then v4 since the two price lev-
els maximize the expected revenue to 0.9+0.72 = 1.62. How-
ever, if v3 is chosen first, then v4 is not an optimal bid level to
choose next. The first reason is that v4 is unnecessarily close
to v3, which may introduce inefficiency into the auction. The
second reason is for its low expected revenue increase. Based
on our ERI scheme, when determining the first bid level, the
ERI of v3 is (3−0)∗(0.3+0.18+0.12+0.1) = 2.1, while ERIs
for v1, v2, v4, v5, v6 are 1, 1.8, 1.6, 1.1, and 0.6 respectively.
Thus v3 is chosen as the first bid level since it will bring in the
maximal expected revenue increase. When determining the
second bid level, the ERIs for v1 is (1−0)∗(0.1+0.2) = 0.3,
v2 is (2−0)∗0.2 = 0.4, v4 is (4−3)∗(0.18+0.12+0.1) = 0.4,
v5 is (5−3)∗ (0.12+0.1) = 0.44 and v6 is (6−3)∗0.1 = 0.3.
So v5 is going to be the second bid level for it yields the
maximal expect revenue increase, 0.44, instead of v4 when
using the expected revenue sum scheme.
Based on Example 1, the main intuition behind our greedy
strategy is that at each step the price level which can pro-
duce the largest expected revenue increase is chosen as a
bid level. The process repeats m times, each time picks the
price level with the largest expected revenue increase among
the rest, until all the bid levels are found (note that we set
l0 = Vmin as the reserve price).
4. EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
In this section we present extensive experimental results to
benchmark our scheme against two competitors - one is a ba-
sic scheme which is supposed to know the distribution form
of bidder valuation and uses a strategy to evenly choose price
levels around the most frequent valuation values; the other
is a k-armed bandit scheme which also has been adopted in
[9] to choose the reserve price.
We outline the experimental settings first. Since the goal
of this paper is to choose bid levels, for ease of discussion
we always set l0 (the reserve price) to Vmin. We assume
the number of participating bidders to be uniformly dis-
tributed within range 2 to b (the maximum number of bid-
ders). For bidder valuation range, we assume a continuous
range Vmin = 0 and Vmax = 10, within which the bidder
valuation is supposed to be uniformly, normally and expo-
nentially distributed. All the experiments are based on these
three different valuation distributions respectively. The nor-
mal valuation distribution is parameterized with mean (Vmax−
Vmin)/2 and variance 0.2, the uniform and exponential val-
uation distributions are both over the range [Vmin, Vmax]
(i.e., [0, 10]). The number of price levels is fixed at 100
(i.e. W = 100) throughout this section, and they are evenly
sliced from Vmin to Vmax (i.e., the set of price levels is
{0.1, 0.2, ..., 9.9, 10}). Except for the experiment against dif-
ferent number of bid levels used, in the rest experiments the
number of bid levels used is set to 10, i.e. m = 10 (note
the first bid level l0 is reserve price and is set to Vmin = 0).
All the experiment results are averaged over 10 episode of
auctions, where each episode consists of N = 2000 auction
rounds each of which simulates the process of auctioning an
item.
4.1 PDF estimation when bidder valuation dis-
tribution is fixed
The standard Gaussian function is employed in our kernel
method for estimating the closing price probability, and one
could apply sophisticated technique to determine the best
bandwidth h [15]. For simplicity, here we empirically set the
bandwidth h to 0.8 according to [15]. The kernel method
utilizes the past auction data (i.e. closing prices of the past
auction rounds) to estimate the probability density of the
closing prices. At the beginning of an auction episode, since
there is no past data, we obtain these values by running
mockup auctions till some pre-specified number of rounds
named initial rounds IR. That is, for the first IR rounds,
we set the m bid levels evenly (using the same method for
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setting bid levels in the basic competitor scheme) and record
the closing prices for each of the IR auction rounds. Except
the experiment on testing different IR values, the rest of the
experiments reported below has IR set to 50.
We first present the results when the bidder valuation dis-
tribution remains unchanged throughout the auction episode.
In Figures 3, 5 and 7 we present the estimated results using
kernel method over exponentially, normally and uniformly
distributed bidder valuation, respectively. Based on these
estimated closing price probabilities, our greedy strategy is
performed to choose bid levels. It yields the results over the
three valuation distributions in Figures 4, 6 and 8 respec-
tively, in which the bar represents the probability that the
auction round would be closed at the corresponding price
level based on the past observations.
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Figure 3: Probability estimation on data with expo-
nentially distributed bidder valuation
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Figure 4: The frequencies of being chosen as bid
level for each price level for exponentially dis-
tributed bidder valuation
The lines with diamond markers in Figures 3, 5 and 7
represent the frequency (in percentage) of highest bidder
valuation over each price levels. Since the bidder valuation
is secret to the auctioneer who has no idea about the distri-
bution, we reveal the highest bidder valuation so that we can
compare the estimated closing price probability using kernel
method with the true distribution of highest bidder valua-
tion (note that highest bidder valuation affects the closing
price, so we round the highest valuation to its floor price level
such that the highest valuation distribution could be ap-
proximately observed through the frequency of correspond-
ing price levels in the figures). Using the kernel method, the
estimated probability of being a closing price for each price
level, as depicted by the lines with circle markers, can well
approximate the highest bidder valuation.
In Figures 4,6 and 8, we present frequency for each price
level of being chosen as a bid level using our greedy strat-
egy. The bars show that corresponding to each of the three
valuation distributions, the frequencies of those price levels
that are chosen as bid levels are approximating the shape
of the highest valuation distribution in Figure 3,5 and 7,
respectively.
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Figure 5: Probability estimation on data with nor-
mally distributed bidder valuation
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Figure 6: The frequencies of being chosen as bid
level for each price level for normally distributed
bidder valuation
4.2 PDF estimation when bidder valuation dis-
tribution changes
In this section we present experiment results for dynamic
situations when the bidder valuation changes from one dis-
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Figure 7: Probability estimation on data with uni-
formly distributed bidder valuation
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Figure 8: The frequencies of being chosen as bid
level for each price level for exponentially dis-
tributed bidder valuation
tribution to another during the auction episode. For ex-
ample, bidder valuation may follow normal distribution in
the first X auction rounds, and then changes to exponential
distribution after X rounds. The change of bidder valuation
distribution is meaningful in real world auctions, since bid-
der valuation may be affected by bidder’s interest shifting or
the supply of items being auctioned. For simplicity we set
X to N
2
= 1000 rounds, that is bidder valuation distribution
remains the same in the first half of an auction episode and
then changes in the last half. In Figures 9 and 11 we present
the estimation results using kernel method when bidder val-
uation distribution changes from normal to exponential, and
from normal to uniform, respectively. The curves show that
the kernel method is capable of modelling the closing price
probability in face of a changing bidder valuation distribu-
tion. Correspondingly, in Figures 10 and 12 we give the
result frequency for each price level, which represents the
frequencies that each price level is chosen as a bid level.
4.3 Performance Comparison
In this section we present the performance comparisons
between our method and two competitors in terms of the av-
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Figure 9: Probability estimation on data with bid-
der valuation distribution changes from normal to
exponential
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Figure 10: The frequencies of being chosen as bid
level for each price level with bidder valuation dis-
tribution changes from normal to exponential
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Figure 11: Probability estimation on data with bid-
der valuation distribution changes from normal to
uniform
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Figure 12: The frequencies of being chosen as bid
level for each price level with bidder valuation dis-
tribution changes from normal to uniform
erage auctioneer revenue. The first competitor named basic
scheme evenly chooses bid levels following the bidder valu-
ation distribution. For example, suppose bidder valuation
follows uniform distribution over range [0,10] and the num-
ber of bid levels is m = 10, the basic scheme then choose bid
levels 1, 2, ..., 9, 10 (assume 0 is the reserve price); in case of
a normal distribution valuation with mean µ and variance σ
over range [0,10], the basic scheme then chooses m bid levels
evenly from range [µ − 3σ, µ + 3σ] that accounts for about
99.7% of bidder valuation values. The second competitor is
a k-armed bandit scheme which also has been adopted in [9]
in choosing the reserve price. We also highlight the highest
bidder valuation (this value is the upper bound of auction-
eer revenue) in the results so that we can compare how close
these three methods approach to the revenue upper bound.
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Figure 13: Comparison results on different maxi-
mum numbers of participating bidders with expo-
nentially distributed bidder valuation
The number of participating bidders will greatly affect the
auctioneer revenue, as has been studied in [6, 7, 9]. In order
to show performances with different number of participating
bidders, we vary the parameter b, the maximum number
of bidders, with 2, 4, 8, 10, 20, 40, 60, 80, 100 and 200. Note
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Figure 14: Comparison results on different max-
imum numbers of participating bidders with nor-
mally distributed bidder valuation
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Figure 15: Comparison results on different maxi-
mum numbers of participating bidders with expo-
nentially distributed bidder valuation
that in our experiments the number of participating bidders
is uniformly distributed within range [2, b]. From Figure
13,14 and 15, we can see that under the three distribution
assumptions all three methods will achieve higher average
revenue as the maximum number of bidders b increases. Our
kernel method for choosing bid levels outperforms the two
competitors consistently.
Next, we investigate how the number of bid levels affect
the revenue. The number of bid levels m is crucial in auc-
tion, too many bid levels will be inefficient although a higher
average revenue could be guaranteed; whereas few bid levels
can finish the auction quickly with a lower average revenue
[6, 7]. In our experiments, given the number of price levels
W = 100 within [0, 10], we vary the number of bid levels
m (except the reserve price level 0) with 2, 5, 8, 10, 20, 30,
40, 50, and 60 respectively. From the results in Figures 16,
17 and 18, observe that the average revenue will increase
with a larger number of bid levels. However, after a certain
number of bid levels (about m = 20, i.e., 20/100 = 20% of
the price levels are chosen as bid levels), the average rev-
enue reaches a plateau for all three methods with normal
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Figure 16: Comparison results on different number
of bid levels used with exponentially distributed bid-
der valuation
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Figure 17: Comparison results on different number
of bid levels used with normally distributed bidder
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Figure 18: Comparison results on different number
of bid levels used with uniformly distributed bidder
and uniform valuation distributions. Our method is shown
to be superior to its competitors with different number of
bid levels.
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Figure 19: Comparison results on different number
of initial rounds for kernel method with exponen-
tially distributed bidder valuation
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Figure 20: Comparison results on different number
of initial rounds for kernel method with normally
distributed bidder valuation
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Figure 21: Comparison results on different number
of initial rounds for kernel method with uniformly
distributed bidder valuation
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Finally, we investigate the effect on the initial round num-
ber IR affects the average revenue. We set the IR value to
5, 10, 20, 50, 80, 100, 200 and 300 respectively, and present
the results in Figure 19, 20 and 21. We show that our kernel
method works well with a small IR. The explanation is that
we adopt the basic scheme in the first IR rounds to collect
closing prices for our kernel method, whose performance is
inferior to the kernel method as demonstrated in Figures 13,
14, 15, 16, 17 and 18. If IR is set to be large, the final av-
erage revenue of the kernel method may drop slightly since
the result is averaged over the first IR rounds.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper we are concerned with the efficiency of choos-
ing bid levels adaptively in a dynamic environment in which
similar items are auctioned repeatedly. In an auction, the
closing price is closely correlated with the highest bidder val-
uation, which is unknown to the auctioneer. To maximize
revenue, the auctioneer needs to propose bid levels that can
well capture the highest bidder valuation. To achieve this
goal, first we employed a non-parametric kernel method to
estimate the closing price probability based on previous auc-
tion data, and show that our approach is robust and accurate
against changing bidder valuation. Based on the estimated
closing price probability, a greedy strategy was devised to
choose bid levels. We conducted extensive experiments for
comparing our method with 2 other methods. The results
demonstrate that our method is superior consistently to its
competitors in terms of average revenue. In future work, we
plan to compare our method with other existing schemes on
choosing bid levels such as the one proposed in [6] using real
datasets.
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